

Date	Aug 5 1999
Author	DA Henderson
Title	Bioterrorism and destruction of the virus
Event	Macfarlane Burnet Centenary Symposium on Immunology and Virology
Event Sponsor	Walter & Eliza Hall Inst of Medical Research; Macfarlane Burnet Centre for Medical Research; Austr Soc of Microbiology; Austr Soc for Immunology
Event location	Melbourne, Australia
Notes	
Publ as	

- Post WWII offensive weapons prog. U.S. Canada Russia
- 1972 BTWC

Soviet Union - major expansion
1980 Weaponizing of smallpox - 80-100 tons.
R+D at Vector, Koltovo, Novosibirsk
Manufacture at Sergiev Posad (ZAGORSK)

Enormous strides in the science + bioengineering of

- Who would use. Where one might expect confidence.
- Implications - no actual experience since mid 1700s

Smallpox the disease ① ② ③

Moscow

④ ⑤ ⑥

Yago ⑦ ⑧

Potential for spread

⑨

Spread.

Hospital.

Immunity

Vaccine availability

Potential - for national, even a global catastrophe. Vaccine - only method to stem.



Second issue - question of destruction of smallpox virus stocks. - some history here is required.

1980 - end of smallpox - WHO Adv. Com. formed - Frank Kamen as chair -

To deal 6 many questions from oversight of studies of monkeypox in Zaire to maintenance of vaccine stocks and variola virus distribution.

WHO - 70s + 80s - inventory of all labs. which might have variola virus

Resolution to destroy or transfer. → 2 known labs.

+ 1980s - pressure from many countries to destroy - Cold War - U.S + Soviet Union

- No research strains. Why keep? Why? BSL 4 - animals.

✓ ⑩ WHO Committee 1980 - balance between accidental release + research loss.

⑪

1990s only.

⑫ 1993 endorsement of destruction - Brian Mahy.

⑬ Preservation of genetic info.

⑭ 1996 WHA resolution. -

But there was to be one more chapter - Sudden interest ^{mainly from} DOD re: Keeping the virus.
Considerable concern & Difficult to come up to a specific rationale - hypothesis: and full report.
Decided to request IOM Com. to look at possible uses of intact variola virus for research.
Specifically instructed to look only at possible research uses
to ignore cost, priority such research should enjoy, practicality, possibility.
In interests of objectivity - & include no one who had worked ~~with~~ directly with smallpox ~~in~~
~~none of the committees~~ had in the lab or in the field.

A report was issued - focusing esp. on the possible development of an anti-viral agent.
and a new vaccine.
⑮ IOM CAVEAT ~~esp. if one has a strong and abiding belief in the loss of the virus~~

Note: in particular because IOM report seized upon as supporting retention of the virus.
This, explicitly, it did not - Chm. of Com., in fact, supported destruction.

⑩⑪ ~~WHA~~ WHA resolution

Who should decide?

Now, however, a commitment for research - identified by U.S. delegates is important -
predictably, one will hear from other quarters that such research cannot be left to
the big powers. Reasonably the subject will be raised