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Notes	
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The ^{concept} ~~thought~~ that microbes might be deliberately utilized as biological weapons is morally

repugnant to all of us in the fields of biology and medicine. It is a subject which we ^{all} would prefer to ignore or

to dismiss and, in fact, until very recently, we have succeeded in doing so. The fact that such weapons have so

seldom been used over the past century encourages the belief that past is prologue. ^{Although} ^{Japan used} It is well-documented that such

weapons ~~did not~~ ^{were used} in a number of areas in China during the Second World War ^{that this is not widely}

concealed and not widely known. ^{That program ceased at the end of the war.} ^{It is possible that Polaremic may have been used by Soviet forces at} ^{Stalingrad, but ~~there~~ these are the only known} ^{use of bio weapons in the past 60 years.}

was opened for signature. ^{It} ^{The Convention of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention}

~~provided assurance that such weapons would not be used.~~ ^{more} ^{The Convention called for termination of all research on}

offensive bio weapons and the destruction of all existing stocks. ^{More than 140 nations ratified it.} ^{including the Soviet}

Union and Iraq. Most countries complied - ~~Russia~~ ^{the Soviet Union} and Iraq were clear exceptions as you will hear today.

Since 1990, when I became a science adviser to President Bush, ^{Although}

~~the threat has been kept reasonably well informed.~~ ^{kept} ^{reasonably well informed} ^{Until the mid 1990s}

As Assistant Secretary of Health, I had been ^{kept} ^{reasonably well informed} of the biological weapons threat. ^{biological weapons were a} ^{to policy makers}

concern ~~the~~ but the threat seemed reasonably remote. It ^{is} ^{was}, after all, not an easy or straightforward

task to identify sufficiently virulent strains of the most problematical organisms; to propagate them in sufficiently large

quantity without killing those ^{the organism} ^{was} trying to grow the organism; to dry ~~them~~ or other wise package them for use;

and to disseminate them widely. ^{It is} ^{is} ^{was} clear that this ^{is} ^{was} not

we might use to produce vaccines. It costs very little money to do so. ~~It~~ More is known about

Iraq's program than the programs in other countries and this will be discussed by Hansish Kiltip. ~~the~~

With economic conditions being a problem in Russia and many scientists being recruited to positions in other countries, one can only surmise the extent of the bio weapons proliferation.

What might be the ~~implications~~ ^{the release} of a biological weapon in a ^{industrialized} modern city can

only be guessed as there has, to date, been only one ^{accidental} ~~release~~ of a ^{bio} weapon - anthrax - in Russia. ^{Based on} ~~Based on~~ ^{the experience and the experiences in} ~~other naturally~~ occurring outbreaks, I shall endeavor to capture some of the concerns and problems

associated with a smallpox or anthrax release in a modern city.

Preparation for a ~~civilian~~ ^{civilian} response to an assault are still at an early stage in my own

country. The most advanced preparations have been made by the City of New York. The director

of that effort, Jerry Hauer, will discuss their plans and this will be followed by Andy Robinson

who will discuss activities in Australia.

Finally, one of the most important questions - what can be done in the way of research

to prevent or mitigate the threat. Steve Morse, director of the DOD Advanced Research

Projects will discuss these.

At the end of this session, we have provided as much as an hour for discussion ^{and as time permits} ~~but, if possible,~~ we

will take a few questions after each of the presentations. In the pm, I would note that there will be
as special ~~conference~~ ^{workshop} ~~at 10:30 AM tomorrow~~ ^{based on such experiences as I have had} ~~at 10:30 AM tomorrow~~ ^{at 10:30 AM tomorrow}

~~would be confident~~ ^{the scientists fear for well as others,}
For many of you, I suspect that this may be your first exposure to some extremely unpleasant
reality. It is a subject which is unlikely ^{to go away} ~~to go away~~ ^{Bioterrorism}

realities. You will be hearing much more over the months and years ahead. ^{with} ~~It~~ is a subject ~~to~~ which this audience

^{participating}
must take a more active role because you, all of us in the infectious disease world, willingly or not, will
be ^{the} principal actors ^{the first responders,} ^{does}
be ~~regarded as~~ ^{likely} ~~involved~~ ^{involved} when a bio weapons attack ^{does} occurs.